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LIKE FAMILY: RIGHTS OF NONMARRIED
COHABITATIONAL PARTNERS IN LOSS OF
CONSORTIUM ACTIONS
Abstract: The organization of family life in American society has changed
dramatically in recent decades. Changing societal morals and increases in
divorce rates mean that fewer households are organized around the
traditional nuclear family model. Courts have struggled to understand and
classify these alternative family arrangements, and most have denied
recovery in actions for loss of consortium by nontnarried cohabitants. This
Note argues that changes in related areas of law and in the loss of
consortium doctrine itself indicate that nonrnarried cohabitants should be
allowed to recover. Specifically, jtalicial understanding of the purpose of
loss of consortium recovery has shifted, and nonnaarried cohabitants have
been allowed to recover in closely analogous actions such as negligent
infliction of emotional distress. This Note proposes adoption of a standard
similar to the one employed in negligent infliction of emotional distress
actions. Such a standard provides a framework to determine whether
damage to a relationship is severe enough to be compensable, while still
providing adequate safeguards to prevent a wave of frivolous suits.
INTRODUCTION
Nonmarital cohabitation is a growing trend in American society
and has increased rapidly in the past few decades.' Since 1977, the
number of cohabitating couples has more than quadrupled. 2 This
rapid increase in cohabitation and the corresponding decline in mar-
riage rates have been described as two of the most significant social
changes of our time.3
The increased incidence of nonmarital cohabitation represents a
watershed demographic shift in how people organize their intimate
and familial relations.4 Indeed, cohabitational relationships account
for 12% of all current unions and 31% of all unions for individuals
1 Lynne M. Casper & Philip N. Cohen, Ilow Does POSSLQ Measure Up? Historical Esti-
mates of Cohabitation, 37 DEMOGRAPIIY 237, 239 (2000).
2 Id.
5 Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine 1'. Kenney, Marriage Delayed or filarriage Forgone? New
Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. Women, 66 Am. Soc. lbw. 506, 506 -:r7 (2001).
4 See id.
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between the ages of nineteen and twenty-four. 5 The trend of cohabita-
tion is remarkable not only for the number of couples engaging in
such relationships, but also because of the percentage of people who
participate in a cohabitational relationship at some point during their
lives.6
 The percentage of women who have been involved in a hetero-
sexual cohabitational relationship at some point in their lives rose
from 33% in 1987 to 45% by 1995. 7
 Therefore, nearly half of the
population now engages in these relationships, which were once
atypical and perceived by many as immoral. 8
The law has not kept pace with changing attitudes toward non-
marital cohabitation.6 Courts seem particularly hesitant to allow cohabi-
tational partners to recover in tort actions, such as loss of consortium. 10
The loss of consortium claim allows spouses and other family members
of a person who suffers a tortious injury to bring suit against the tort-
feasor. 11
 This action provides recovery for the damage to their relation-
ship resulting from the injury to the direct victim. 12 Throughout most
of American and English legal history, this action was only available to
husbands." But over the past fifty years, courts' understanding of loss
5 Larry L. Bumpass & Ilsien-lien Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and the Implications for Chil-
dren's Family Contexts in the United States, 54 PoruLATIoN Slim. 29, 32 (2000). Cohabitation
can serve several purposes based on the values and goals of the participants. See generally
Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 615
(1989); Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 920 (1991). Commonly, it is seen as a sort of "trial marriage" where
individuals live together for a relatively short period of time as a test of compatibility be-
fore ultimately marrying. See Bumpass et al., supra, at 920. For others, cohabitation is a
substitute for marriage. See id. Some cohabitating couples reject the gender roles that they
perceive as being part and parcel of marriage, while others simply desire a less formal
means of commitment.t. See id. at 921.
6 See litnnpass & Lu, supra note 5, at 31.
7 Id. at 32.
Id.
9 See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Cal. 1988); Feliciano v. Rosemar Sil-
ver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1987).
10 See Elden, 758 P.2d at 586; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096. But see Reep v. Comm'r of
the Dep't of Employment & Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (Mass. 1992) (allowing non-
married cohabitational partners the same rights as married spouses to unemployment
insurance when they relocate with their partners).
11 See Mailer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2(1 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (allowing both
spouses to recover); Ferrite'. v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Mass.
1980) (allowing children to recover); Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Mich.
1960) (discussing interests protected by loss of consortium actions); Fernandez v. Wal-
green Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774, 782-83 (N.M. 1998) (allowing grandparents to recover).
12 Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782.
13 See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813.
20051	 Non-Married Cohabitation in Loss of Consortium.	 393
of consortium has changed." Consequently, courts have broadened the
class of potential plaintiffs considerably. 15 Despite the recent willingness
to consider the emotional harm suffered by plaintiffs other than
spouses, the great majority of courts have clung to a bright-line no mar-
riage/no recovery rule which has excluded nonmarried cohabitational
partners.' 6 Some argue that the rule limiting recovery only to married
partners is arbitrary and leads to unjust results.''
Given the rise of nonmarital cohabitation, it is not difficult to envi-
sion scenarios where the bright-line no marriage/no recovery rule for
loss of consortium creates potentially unjust results.' 8 Consider a hypo-
thetical set of neighbors, two heterosexual couples living next door to
each other.'`' The individuals in Couple A, an unmarried man and
woman, have been in a committed relationship for nearly a decade and
purchased their house together nearly five years ago. 2° They are in-
volved in every aspect of each other's lives, and a year ago, they
adopted a child.21 A second couple, Couple B, lives next door in a
house owned by a woman who recently eloped after a two-month
whirlwind romance. 22 Her new husband moved in a few weeks ago. 25
One day, as both men are walking across the street to check the mail,
they are both struck by a negligent driver who sped through the neigh-
borhood.24 Both men were grievously injured, and have trouble carry-
14 Id. at 814; &Triter; 413 N.E.2d at 696; Fernandez, 968 1'.2d at 782.
15 See !Mailer, 183 F.2d at 813; Ferri ter, 413 N.E.2d at 696; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782.
16 See, e.g., Elden, 758 P.2d at 588.
17 See Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 955 (N.M. 2003) (rejecting a bright-line test de-
nying cohabitants the ability to recover).
18 Elden, 758 P.2d at 582-83.
19 The issue of recovery for nonmarital cohabitational partners has obvious application
to homosexual as well as heterosexual partners. See Coodridgc v. Dept of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003). Discussion of the tort rights of homosexual partners is be-
yond the scope of this Note. For discussion of this issue, see John G. Culhane, A "Clanging
Silence": Same-Sex Couples and Tort Lam 89 Ky. L.J. 911, 049 (2(1(11). Additionally, as states
begin to address gay marriage and civil unions, homosexuals may be afforded protections
similar to those of married heterosexual couples. See Good ridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949. It is worth
noting, however, that judicial recognition of the nature and significance of the damaged
relationships could play an important role in the debate over same-sex marriage. Sec id. at
955-58. Such recognition may serve to extend certain important rights, such as the ability
to sue for loss of consortium, to homosexuals, thus lessening some of the pressure for legis-
latures to recognize same-sex marriage or to create alternatives such as civil unions. See id.
2U See, e.g., Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), over-
ruled by Elden, 758 P.2d at 582-83 (describing the plaintiff? similar living arrangement).
21 See id.
22 See id.
22 See id.
21 See Elden, 582 P.2d at 582-83.
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ing on with daily life and relating to their partners. 25 There can be little
doubt that the woman in Couple A suffers as much, if not more, emo-
tional harm and damage to her long-standing relationship than the
woman in Couple B, who had hardly begun to build a life with her new
spouse.26
 But, the woman in Couple B would be allowed to recover for
the emotional harm she suffered, while her neighbor would be turned
away by the courts.27 One can imagine other compelling scenarios in
which the long-term partner of an injured individual suffers terrible
emotional injuries but is denied recovery because the couple had not
yet married or had chosen not to marry. 28
This Note examines social and legal trends in order to determine
whether the current understanding of loss of consortium actions is in
step with social reality. 29 Part I explores the history of the loss of con-
sortium action." Specifically, it examines the altered understanding
of the action in the marital context, current trends which have ex-
tended recovery to other family members, and the refusal of most
courts to allow nonmarried cohabitational partners to recover. 31 Part
H discusses the expansion of tort recovery for nonmarried cohabita-
tional partners." The related tort action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, which in several states has been found to include
cohabitational partners, is explored as a useful model for extending
recovery in loss of consortium actions," A recent New Mexico case
extending recovery in loss of consortium actions is also examined. 34
Finally, Part III argues that legal and social trends indicate that loss of
consortium claims should be broadened to include non married co-
habitational partners and criticizes common policy reasons cited for
denying recovery."
26
 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
26 See infra notes 223-234 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 36-135 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 36-135 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 136-211 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 141-178 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 184-211 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 212-313 and accompanying text.
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I. DIE HISTORY OF Tin: Loss OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM
A. Origins of the Claim
Over the past several decades, judicial interpretation of the loss
of consortium claim has changed dramatically. 36 Courts have aban-
doned traditional property-based theories of recovery. 37 The modern
understanding of the claim allows for damages based on harm to
more intangible relational interests like love, affection, and compan-
ionship. 38 This evolution in the interests protected by the loss of con-
sortium action enabled wives to recover when their husbands were
injured and ultimately lead to an even broader expansion of the class
of plaintiffs allowed to bring loss of consortium claims.39
Loss of consortium is an old but controversial cause of action.°
The claim evolved from older common law loss of services actions.41
These actions allowed a master to recover when a tortfeasor injured
his servant, making the servant less able to perform duties.° The
courts reasoned similarly that because husbands were entitled to serv-
ices from their wives, a husband should be allowed to recover when
injury to his wife made her less able to fulfill her duties.°
Upon marriage, men assumed property interests in their wives."
Wives lost all legal identity and in many respects became chattel be-
longing to their husbands.° Lack of education for women and tre-
mendous societal pressure meant that subservience was socially in-
" See, e.g., Hitaffer r. Argonne Co., I83 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Ferrite'. v. Dan-
iel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Mass. 1980); Fernandez v. Walgreen Hast-
ings Co., 908 P.2d 774, 782-83 (N.M. 1998).
37 !Mager, 183 F.2d at 813; Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227, 229-31 (Mich.
1960).
58 Intoner, 183 F,2c1 at 814; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782-83.
" See Meager, 183 F.2d at 813; !Writer, 413 N.E.2d at 696; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782-83.
40 see, e.g.,
 West v. City ol' San Diego, 353 P.2d 929, 934 (Cal. 1960) (eliminating the tra-
ditional right of husbands to sue for loss of consortium on the ground that it was irrational
and discriminatory to distinguish between husbands and wives, who were not allowed to
recover). Later cases established the right of both husbands and wives to recover for loss of
consortium. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 675 (Cal. 1974).
41 Montgomery, 101 N.W.2d at 230; see Comment, Extending Consortium Rights to Unmar-
ried Cohabitants, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 911, 914-15 (1981); Kelly M. Martin, Note, Loss of Con-
sortium: Should California Protect Cohabitants' Relational Interests?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467,
1468-69 (1985).
42 Martin, supra note 41, at 1468-69.
43 See. Montgomery, 101 N.W.2d at 230.
44 CollImelit, ,supra note 41, at 914-25.
45 See Montgomery, 101 N.W.2d at 230.
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grained, and courts ensured that it was also legally enforceable. 46
Women also lost all rights to their property upon marriage. 47 As Hen-
rici de Bracton, a famous early English legal commentator, notes, a
wife "has nothing which is not her husband's." 48 Inherent in this un-
derstanding of the marital relationship was the idea that a wife owed
certain immutable duties to her husband, such as labor inside and
outside the home, all tasks relating to housekeeping, sexual services,
and all child-rearing responsibilities. 49 When his property interests in
his wife were damaged, the husband had the right to sue for recov-
ery." Because women had no similar property-like interests in their
husbands, they had no right to bring suit for loss of consortium. 51
As time passed and societal values changed, courts recognized
that loss of consortium claims encompassed not only material services
from the wife, but also damage to less tangible aspects of the marital
relationship like affection and companionship 5 2 Over time, damage to
the marriage relationship became the primary ground for recovery."
This shift in emphasis toward protecting the relational interests in the
marriage, rather than protecting property interests in a wife, made ex-
clusion of wives from loss of consortium claims logically unsound. ,"
Courts were slow, however, to overturn the old common law doctrine."
Not until the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia de-
cided the landmark case of Hilaffer u Argonne Co. in 1950 did a court
allow a wife to recover for loss of consortium for injuries to her hus-
band." Lucia Hitaffer brought an action for loss of consortium against
her husband's employer, claiming the company's negligence caused his
injury on the job that subsequently interfered with her relational inter-
ests in the marriage.57 The court overruled a district court decision
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 5 HENHICI DE BRACTON, nE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 423 (Sir Travers
Twiss ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1990) (1882).
49
 See Montgomery, 101 N.W.2d at 229-30.
50 Montgomery, 101 N.W.2d at 230; Comment, supra note 41, at 915.
51 Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813; Montgomery, 101 N.W.2d at 230.
52 See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814; Martin, supra note 41, at 1469.
53 See Martin, .supra note 41, at 1469.
54 Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813.
55 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 525 1'.2d at 675. The right of wives to sue for loss of consortium
was first established in a federal case in 1950. Hitaffer, 183 F.2(1 at 813. But many states
barred wives from suing well into the 1970s. Rodriguez, 525 P,2d at 675.
56 183 F.2d at 813.
57 ld. at 812.
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dismissing the suit for failure to state a cause of action. 38 The court
found that aside from outmoded justifications behind most of the early
common law decisions, it was "unable to disclose any substantial ration-
ale on which we would be willing to predicate a denial of a wife's action
for loss of consartium."59
Consortium thus came to encompass far more than the bare ma-
terial services that originally provided the grounds for recovery. 6° The
court reasoned that in addition to material services, love, affection,
and sexual relations combined to form the basis for recovery in loss of
consortium actions, 61 Under this idea of consortium, a wife has inter-
ests in the relationship that are identical to those of her husband, and
thus, should be allowed to recover on an equal basis. 62 The ability of
wives to recover for loss of consortium heralded the abandonment of
the anachronistic idea that the action provided recovery for pecuni-
ary losses in the form of services.63 This shift established that loss of
consortium actions protect the relational interests in the marriage. 64
B. Extension of Loss of Consortium Claims to Children and
Other Family Members
The recognition that consortium claims protect relational inter-
ests led several courts to extend recovery beyond spouses to include
others who experience damage to their relationship when a person
suffers a tortious injury, 63 Siblings, grandparents, and children of the
direct victim have been allowed to recover in several states. 66 Although
the reasoning underlying the expansion of the group of plaintiffs who
can bring loss of consortium actions could logically transcend familial
relationships, the majority of courts have continued to draw clear
lines based on blood and legal relationships.°
56 Id.
59 Id. at 813.
41° See id. at 814.
61 Ilitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814,
" See id. at 818.
" See id. at 814.
64 See id.
65 See, e.g., Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 69{i (allowing child recovery); Fernandez, 968 1),2d at
782 (allowing grandparent recovery); Leavy v. Yates, 142 N.Y.S,2c1 874, 876 (Sup. Ct. 1955)
(allowing sibling recovery).
66 See, e.g., Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 696 (allowing child recovery); Fernando, 968 1).2d at
782 (allowing grandparent recovery); Leavy, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (allowing sibling recovery).
67 See Fernandez, 968 l',2(1 at 784.
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Several states have recognized that children can recover for loss
of consortium when a parent suffers negligently caused injuries 68
When the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided Ferriter v.
Daniel O'Connell's & Sons, Inc. in 1980, it became one of the first state
courts to recognize that children have an independent claim for
damage to their relationship when their parent sustains an injury. 69
Michael Ferriter was injured during the course of his employment
when a two hundred pound load of lumber fell from a crane, striking
him in the neck and head." He was paralyzed from the neck down. 71
His wife and two children sued for loss of consortium. 72
 The court
reasoned that although the common law was silent on the issue of
whether children had a protected right in the relationship with their
parent, parents have long been entitled to recover when a tortfeasor
injures their child, thus depriving them of the love and companion-
ship that characterizes the parent-child relationship." Because chil-
dren generally enjoy the same rights to protection and to legal redress
as other members of society, it was anomalous to hold that a parent
could recover for damage to the parent-child relationship but a child
could not.74 Therefore, the court held that Mr. Ferriter's children
should be allowed to state a claim for loss of consortium if they could
show dependence on the injured parent."
Later cases in Massachusetts further refined the doctrine of loss
of parental consortium and addressed what made a child "dependent"
for purposes of the action." Dependence was not a matter of eco-
nomic reliance." Instead, it related to the child's reliance on the in-
jured parent for management of their physical needs and for emo-
tional guidance and support." Thus, in extending the ability to sue
for loss of consortium, courts explicitly relied on the emotional harm
suffered by the child as a result of damage to the relationship with the
68
 Villareal v. State Delft of Transp., 774 P.2c1 213, 216 (Ariz. 1989); Weitl v. Moes, 311
N.W.2(1 259, 270 (Iowa 1981); Guiliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 323 (Ky. 1997); &niter,
413 N.E.2E1 at 696; Craft v. Hermes Consol., Inc., 797 P.2d 559, 560 (Wyo. 1990).
69 413 N.E.2d at 696.
7° Id. at 691.
7t Id.
72 Id.
" Id. at 694.
" See &miter, 413 N.E.2E1 at 696.
75 Id.
7° Barbosa v. Hopper Feeds, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Mass. 1989); Glicklich v. Spievack,
542 N.E.2d 287, 292 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
I3arbosa, 537 N.E.2c1 at 104.
7B Id.
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parent, not on antiquated concepts of loss of services or support le-
gally due to the child. 79
Siblings and grandparents of an injured child have also been al-
lowed to recover for damage to their relational interests. 89 In 1955,
the New York Superior Court held in Leavy v. Yates that the twin of an
eight-year-old boy killed in a car accident could sue for loss of his
brother's "companionship, affection, and guidance."8 ' Additionally,
some states have held that grandparents can recover for loss of con-
sortium when their grandchildren suffer negligently caused injuries. 82
For example, in 1998, in Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., the New
Mexico Supreme Court allowed recovery for a grandmother who
served as a caretaker for her twenty-two-month-old granddaughter."
She watched helplessly as the child died from suffocation due to a
wrongly filled prescription." In allowing the grandmother to recover
for loss of consortium, the court stated that her damages flowed from
the close and unique emotional relationship with the victim, not her
family title." The extension of recovery to siblings and grandparents
further indicates that the nature of the relationship shared by the vic-
tim and person seeking recovery, not the legal relationship of the par-
ties or duties owed, is the key factor in determining who can recover. 86
The recognition in earlier cases that loss of consortium should
focus on damage to intangible interests like love, affection, and guid-
ance made this expansion in who can recover possible. 87 Nonetheless,
it appears that courts were motivated both by the nature of the injured
relationship and by administrability concerns.88 Courts may also have
79 See id.
8° See, e.g., In re Estate of Finley, 601 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ill. 1092) (allowing sibling recov-
ery); Louisville N.R. Co. v. Whisenant, 58 So. 2d 908, 912 (Miss. 1952) (allowing sibling
recovery); Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782-83 (allowing grandparent recovery); Leavy, 142
N.YS.2t1 at 876 (allowing sibling recovery).
81 142 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
82 Fernandez, 968 13.2d at 784; Anderson v. United States, 731 F. Stipp. 391, 400 (D.N.D.
1990) (applying North Dakota law).
83 968 P.2d at 784.
84 Id. at 776-77.
a5 Id. at 782-83. This very progressive view as to the nature of the relationship provid-
ing the basis for a claim for loss of consortium has recently led New Mexico to become the
lirst state to recognize loss of consortium for nonmarried cohabitants who share a
significant relational interest. See discussion of Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 955 (N.M.
2003), infra notes 184-211 and accompanying text.
86 See Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 696; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782-83.
87 See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814.
88 See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988) (stating 	 !fit , need for a
bright-line rule was an important factor in the decision of the case).
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accepted expansion of recovery to this class of potential plaintiffs be-
cause bright-line delineations based on blood and familial ties brought
some clarity and limitations to an otherwise open-ended test. 89
C. Loss of Consortium Claims for Nonmarried Cohabitants
Despite recent expansion of the class of persons able to recover
for loss of consortium, courts have held with near unanimity that
nonmarried cohabitational partners cannot recover for loss of consor-
tium, regardless of the nature and significance of their relationship to
the victim.90 In denying recovery, courts often rely on a similar set of
policy rationales, such as the interest in promoting marriage, the
difficulty in administering a more open-ended rule, and the need to
limit the consequences for negligent acts. 9 i These rationales can be
explored through discussion of an influential case, Elden v. Sheldon,
decided by the California State Supreme Court in 1988.92
In Elden, the court decided that nonmarried cohabitants could
not sue for loss of consortium 9 3 Richard Elden was riding in a vehicle
driven by his long-time cohabitational partner, Linda Eberling, when
they were struck by a car negligently driven by Robert Sheldon. 94 El-
den sustained serious personal injuries as a result of the accident. 95
Eberling was thrown from the car and died a few hours later from her
injuries.98 Elden brought suit against Sheldon for his own injuries. 97
lie also brought actions for loss of consortium and for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to a bystander stemming from witness-
ing the fatal injuries to his cohabitational partner. 98 He alleged in his
complaint that he shared a stable and significant relationship with
Eberling that was equivalent to the marital relationship. 99 A similar re-
lationship was deemed sufficient to allow for recovery under a stan-
59
 See id.
9° See, e.g., Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, PC, 3 P.3d 916, 923 (Alaska 2000);
Elden, 758 P.2d at 586; Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1087).
9E See, e.g., Trombley, 3 P.3d at 923; Elden, 758 P.2c1 at 586; Feliciano, 519 N.E.2d at 1096.
92 758 P.2d at 582.
93 1d, at 588-90 (overruling Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 503 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983)).
94 Id. at 582.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Elden, 758 P.2c1 at 582-83.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 583.
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dard developed in a lower court case, Butcher u Superior Court of Orange
County. 1 °0
The California Supreme Court overturned the Butcher standard
and rejected Elden's claims for bystander negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress and loss of consortium.m Although each claim has dis-
tinct elements, the court reasoned that both actions rose or fell based
on whether Elden shared a sufficient relationship with Eberling to
recover, and largely compressed the reasoning for both actions into a
single discussion." The court reasoned that although the two shared
an emotional relationship, Elden's legal relationship to Eberling was
insufficient to provide a basis for recovery. 103
Like courts in other states, the Elden court was concerned about
the foresecability of harm to a person who was not the spouse of the
direct victim.'" Although conceding that rates of nonmarital cohabita-
tion had indeed increased, and thus the possibility of a tort victim hav-
ing a cohabitational partner was not entirely unexpected, the court
held that a legal relationship between the two was required to meet the
judicial definition of foreseeability." Similarly, most other states have
held that cohabitational partners could not recover for loss of consor-
tium in large part because the relationships and resulting emotional
harm were not foreseeable to the tortfeasor." These courts reason
that marriage, as opposed to cohabitation, is the oldest and most
dominant pattern of establishing a familial relationship in our soci-
ety.'" Because the majority of people marry, a tortfeasor who injures
an individual should also foresee collateral injuries to that person's
spouse, children, and other family members.m In contrast, cohabita-
tion is a comparatively new social development." The court reasoned
that because cohabitation occur's less frequently than traditional mar-
riage, it is often harder to generalize about the emotional investment
m° 188 Cal. Rptr. at 505. In Butcher, Paul and Cindy Forte had lived together for nearly
twelve years. Id. They financially supported one another, filed joint tax returns, and had
joint savings and checking accounts. Id. They also had two children together. Id. The court
held that their relationship was both stable and significant, and thus could provide
grounds for recovery for loss of consortium. Id. at 512.
101 Elden, 758 P.2c1 at 590.
102 See id. at 589-90.
1 °3 See id. at 588-90.
104 See, e.g., Trombley, 3 P.3d at 923; Elden, 758 P.2d at 588; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
1 °5 See Elden, 758 P.2d at 588.
106 See, e.g., Trombley, 3 P.3d at 923; Elden, 758 P.2d at 588; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1090.
107 Tn9mbley, 3 P.3d.at 923; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
108 See Elden, 758 P.2d at 588; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
1°9 See Elden, 758 P.2(1 at 585-86.
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in these relationships than in marital relationships."° Consequently,
traditional tort principles requiring that tortfeasors only be held liable
for the foreseeable consequences of their wrongful or negligent acts
require that cohabitational partners be denied recovery. "'
In addition to concerns about the foreseeability of emotional in-
jury, the Elden court relied on several other policy justifications to
prevent cohabitational partners from recovering for negligent
infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium." 2 Primarily,
the court expressed concern about the impact on marriage, the ad-
ministrability of a rule allowing recovery, and the need to limit liabil-
ity for tortfeasors. 113
First, the court noted that the state has a strong interest in the
marriage relationship and can seek to promote it.'" It observed that
marriage is a socially productive institution. 115
 Marriage promotes in-
dividual happiness and well-being, and also acts as an important
building block of society, promoting stability and beneficial values. 116
The law affords it special protection for this reason. 117 Furthermore,
marriage is a combination of legally defined benefits and accompany-
ing burdens. 118 Only if a couple is willing to undertake the responsi-
bilities entailed in the marital relationship should they be entitled to
the corresponding benefits. 119
 The court viewed the extension of the
right to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss
of consortium as undermining the important state interest in mar-
riage. 12° If people arc able to obtain benefits similar to those accom-
panying marriage without actually being married, the court reasoned
that they would he less likely to enter into marriage, thus weakening
this very important social institution. 121
Second, the court discussed the difficulties inherent in adminis-
tering a law that allowed recovery for nonmarried cohabitational
partners. 122
 Courts would need to inquire into the emotional attach-
Ho See id. at 587-88.
lit Id. at 588.
112 Id. at 586-87.
113 Id. at 586-88.
Elden, 758 P.2(1 at 587.
115 Id. at 586.
116 Id.
117 Id.
1113 Id. at 587.
119 See Elden, 758 l'.2c1 at 587.
In See id. at 586.
121 See id.
122 Id. at 587.
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ment of the victim and the plaintiff in order to determine if it was
sufficiently parallel to a marital or other familial relationship to allow
recovery.'" Because such an inquiry would necessarily focus largely
on intangible factors, it would be difficult to develop a uniform, ob-
jective standard that could be easily applied. 124 The court rejected the
"stable and significant" standard articulated in the Butcher case.'" In
addition, in order to determine who was entitled to recover, courts
would have to undertake an inquiry into matters like sexual fidelity,
economic ties, and emotional commitment. 126 The court saw this as
an undesirable intrusion into private life. 127
Finally, in denying the plaintiff's claims, the Elden court discussed
the need to limit potential liability for tortfeasors by not opening up a
new, large class of potential plaintiffs. 128 The court acknowledged' that
compelling reasons exist for extending recovery, thereby giving legal
recognition to close emotional relationships. 129 Such relationships
may provide as much support and affection as familial relationships,
and emotional harm resulting from injury to one's partner can be
great's° Nevertheless, the court was motivated by the desire for a
bright-line limitation) 31 Failure to enact such a limitation would result
in an unreasonable extension of the scope of liability, which would
have a negative impact on society as a whole.' 32
Elden represents the approach taken by the majority of state
courts in denying recovery to nonmarried cohabitational partners)"
129 M.
124 Elden, 758 P.2d at 587.
125 See id. at 589.
126 Id. at 587.
127
128 14. at 588.
129 Elden, 758 1'.2d at 588.
Id.
151 m.
22 See id. The holding in Elden took sonic by surprise, given the court's previous hold-
ing in Marvin v. Marvin. See Elden, 758 1).2(1 at 590 (citing Marvin v. Marvin, 557 1).2(1 106,
106 (Cal. 1976)). In Marvin, the court held that a nonmarried cohabitational partner was
entitled to payment in compensation for her services during the relationship and ongoing
support after its termination in order to restart her career. 557 P.2d at. M. The conrt rec-
ognized contractual and equitable remedies available to cohabitational partners. Id. at 110.
The court distinguished Elden from Marvin on the grounds that although parties are tree
to hind themselves contractually and forgo marriage, such arrangements cannot be bind-
ing on third parties and do not necessitate the same level of recognition by the state. See
Elden, 758 P.2(1 at 590.
133 See. Elden, 758 P.2d at 585-86; see also Medley v. Strong, 558 N.P..2(1 244, 246 (111.
1990); Gillespie-Linton v. Miles, 473 A.2d 947, 953 (Md. 1984); Se•..•1 o . V. Brookdale
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 546 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923-24 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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Most courts that have addressed the issue rely on very similar policy
rationales to justify denial of recovery."4 Namely, they cite the legiti-
mate state interest in marriage, administrability concerns, and the
need to limit the consequences of tortious acts to those plaintiffs who
are foreseeable.' 35
II. EXPANSION OF TORT RIGHTS FOR COHABITATIONAL PARTNERS
A. A Parallel Tort: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Nearly all courts have denied recovery to nonmarried cohabi-
tants for loss of consortium, but a growing number of courts have
been willing to allow recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 1 S6 These two tort actions are closely related and are very often
brought at the same time. 137 Although associated with loss of consor-
tium, recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is meant
to compensate for the emotional shock caused when a person actually
witnesses the injury of a loved one, not for the later harm to the rela-
tionship. 138 Despite the differences in what is compensated by each
action, recovery in both actions is limited to those who have a close
relationship to the direct victim. 139 Thus, the expansion in recent
years of the class of people who can recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress may have important implications for toss of consor-
tium actionstw
In 1993, in Dunphy v. Gregor, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
handed down a landmark opinion on the issue of bystander recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress."' The court allowed a
woman to recover for emotional distress she suffered from witnessing
the death of her fiance and cohabitational partner. 192 Eileen Dunphy
13'1 See, e.g., Trembley, 3.P.3d at 923; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
E" See, e.g., Trombley, 3 P.3d at 923; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
136 See, e.g., Richmond v. Shatford, No. CA 941249, 1995 1/41 1146885, at *1, *3 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1995); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994).
1s7
	 e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2(1 582, 582-83 (Cal. 1988). In fact, the court in El-
den v. Sheldon relied on the same policy arguments to reject both the loss of consortium
and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Id. at 589. The court dealt with loss of
consortium separately only in a brief section of the opinion, seemingly for the purpose of
expressly overruling Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County. Id. at 589-90.
138 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374; Fernandez. v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774, 777
(N.M. 1998).
isg See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374; Fernandez, 968 P.2(1. at 777.
"') See Elden, 758 P.2d at 589-90.
111 642 A.2d at 380.
142 Id.
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and Michael Burwell became engaged in 1988 and began living to-
gether. 143 In September of 1990, the couple responded to a call for
help from a friend who was stranded on a highway with a flat tire.'"
As Burwell changed the tire on the side of the road, he was struck by a
car negligently driven by the defendant, James Gregor, and was
dragged along the road for neatly 250 feet. 145 Dunphy, who had been
standing just a few feet away, rushed to his side and attempted to wipe
away the blood and dirt from his wounds. 146 He died in the hospital a
few hours later. 147 Dunphy filed a claim for emotional distress she suf-
fered as a result of seeing Burwell fatally injured. 148
The court noted that the requirements for a bystander to recover
for negligently inflicted emotional distress are the following: (1) death
or serious injury of another caused by the defendant's negligence,
(2) marital or intimate familial relationship between the plaintiff and
the injured person, and (3) observation of the death or injury at the
scene of the acciclent." 9 The relationship of the bystander to the direct
victim is important because the presence of deep emotional ties, which
usually accompany marital and family relationships, ensures that the
distress suffered by the bystander is genuine and worthy of contpensa-
tion. 15° But the court also emphasized that it is the presence of these
emotional bonds that provides the basis for recovery, and that the legal
status of the relationship should not be used as a proxy. 151
The court found that intimate, familial-type relationships can ex-
ist outside traditional legal definitions of the family. 152 To determine
whether such a relationship exists, the court considered a variety of
factors, including its duration, degree of mutual dependence, extent
of common contributions to life together, and the extent and quality
143 Id. at 373.
144 id.
145 Id,
146 Dunphy, 642 A.2d a 373.
147 Id.
148 Id. Dunphy did not tile a claim fur loss of consortium, so the court never reached
the issue of whether her relationship with Burwell would also have satisfied the require-
ments for that cause or action. Id.
149 Dunphy, (342 A.2d at 373. These requirements are derived from the California case
of Dillon a. Les,l; and are widely followed in many states. See 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 19(18);
see, e.g., Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 855 (Conn. 1996); Zell V. Meek, 665 So. 2d
1048, 1051 (Fla. 1995); Roberts v. Bruns, 387 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Iowa 1986).
1911 See. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374.
151 See id. at 377.
152 See id.
406	 Boston College Law Review	 IVol. 46:391
of shared experiences.'" The court reasoned that people who enjoy
this type of stable, enduring, familial-type relationship have a cogni-
zable interest in the relationship and in the continued emotional
support that they derive from it. I54 Thus, they should be entitled to
recover when they witness an accident resulting in serious bodily
harm or death of their cohabitational partner. 155 Based on the facts of
the case, the court found that Eileen Dunphy shared this sort of close,
familial-type relationship with her fiance, Michael Burwell, and suf-
fered severe emotional injuries upon witnessing his injury and subse-
quent death. 156 Therefore, it ruled that she should be allowed to state
a claim for emotional distress even though she was not considered a
legal family member. 157
The New Jersey court criticized the California State Supreme
Court's decision in Elden v. Sheldon, and rejected the creation of a
bright-line rule. 1 " The court stated that the creation of a rigid rule
that allows all married couples to recover, but denies recovery to all
nonmarried couples regardless of the significance of their relation-
ship and depth of emotional injuries, is a perversion of the principles
of tort law. 159 The court stated that tort law instead requires analysis of
the duty owed, which turns on the particular facts of the situation at
hand.'m Further, the court reasoned that application of bright-line
rules is administratively simple, but can lead to grossly unfair re-
sults.' 6 ' The court noted that "to foreclose such a plaintiff from mak-
ing a claim based upon emotional harm because her relationship with
the injured person does not carry a particular label is to work a po-
tential injustice, not only in this case but also in too many others." 162
The New Jersey court similarly rejected several other rationales
often given to deny cohabitants the right to recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to a bystander.'" First, the court rea-
soned that the increasing incidence of nonmarital cohabitation makes
it foreseeable that victims of negligent acts could share close emu-
153
 Id. at 378.
15 ' 1 Id. at 380.
155 Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380.
156 See id. at 377.
157 Id. at 380.
' 58
 Id, at 376.
155 See id.
166 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 376.
161 See id. at 378.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 379.
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tional ties with someone to whom they are not married.'" Such a per-
son could suffer severe emotional injuries as a result of witnessing the
injury to a partner. 165 Liability for negligent acts depends on whether
a duty is owed, and duty, in turn, depends on foreseeability. 166 Because
a cohabitational relationship is foreseeable, a negligent actor owes a
duty to the cohabitational partner and can be liable to such a partner
for emotional injuries. 167
Second, the Dunphy court noted that courts are adequately
equipped to make determinations about the nature and quality of the
relationship between cohabitational partners. 168 Similar determinations
are required in loss of consortium cases, in which the court must assess
the quality of a marital relationship in order to award appropriate
damages. 168 Courts have proven that they are capable of such an in-
quiry and can assess "the realities, not simply the legalities, of relation-
ships to assure that resulting emotional injury is genuine and deserving
of com pe n sa.tio n. " 17°
Third, the court reasoned that an examination of the nature of
the relationship would not require undue probing into the private
details of the relationship. 171 Details of the relationship would need to
be examined even if the couple were married, and such examination
is no more problematic in the context of cohabitation than in the
marital context. 172 Finally, the court rejected the notion that extend-
ing recovery to include cohabitational partners would somehow hurt
the state's goal of promoting marriage.'" Realistically, the decision to
marry is not motivated by the ability to have standing to bring a tort
action, and the extension of this cause of action would not otherwise
change the preferential status granted to marriage under the law. 174
In 1995, in Richmond v. Shalford, a Massachusetts Superior Court
went even further than the New jersey court's holding in Dunphy,
finding that a woman who lived with, but who was not engaged to, her
cohabitational partner could recover for the emotional distress she
164 See id. at 377.
165 Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 377.
166 Id. at 376.
1137 Id. at 380.
169 Id. at 378.
169 Id.
170 Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
171 Id. at 378-79.
172 Id. at 379.
170
174 id.
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suffered upon witnessing the injury to her partner when he was hit by
a car. 175
 Like the Dunphy court, the judge in Richmond reasoned that
recovery for a bystander bringing a claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress is premised on a flexible understanding of reason-
able foreseeability, not a bright-line no marriage/no recovery rule. 17°
if a person has a close familial or similar relationship with the direct
victim, it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will suffer emo-
tional injury as a result of the negligent act. 177 The foreseeability of
such an injury is only reinforced by the growing number of couples
who engage in cohabitational relationships in modern society. 178
Although courts have been nearly unanimous in denying cohabi-
tational partners the right to recover for loss of consortium, several
courts have allowed such recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, even in the face of similar policy concerns. 17g Both actions of-
ten arise from the same underlying facts, and both limit recovery to
those who share a close familial-like relationship to the direct victhn. 180
Therefore, the expansion of those who can bring negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims may indicate that it is also time to revisit
the question of who can recover in loss of consortium actions. 181
B. Extension of Loss of Consortium Actions to Nonmarried Cohabitants
Although courts have by and large refused to recognize the right
of nonmarried cohabitants to recover for loss of consortium, changes
in the understanding of consortium, the increasing recognition of
cohabitational relationships in parallel areas of tort law, and evolving
social attitudes about such relationships indicate that courts may need
to reconsider earlier decisions that denied recovery. 182 Recently, one
175 Richmond, 1995 WL 1146885, at *3.
176 Id.
1 " See id.
178
	
id.
175
	 id. at *4. One scholar suggests that this somewhat logically inconsistent result is
an attempt by courts to create a compromise position that would allow recovery to a part-
ner who does indeed suffer emotional harm, but that would not give the relationship the
same Full legal recognition as marriage. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The
Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 North DAME L. REV. 1435, 1461 (2001)
18° See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 373-74; Fernandez, 968 P.2c1 at 777.
181 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 373-74; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 777.
182 See, e.g., Richmond, 1995 WL 1146885, at *3; Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378; Lozoya v. San-
chez, 66 P.3c1 948, 955 (N.M. 2003).
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state supreme court has allowed a nonmarried cohabitational partner
to recover for loss of consortium. 183
In 2003, in Lozoya v. Sanchez, the New Mexico Supreme Court be-
came the first state to recognize the right of a nonmarried cohabitant
to recover for loss of consortiuni. 184 Sarah Lozoya brought a claim for
loss of consortium stemming from the injuries sustained by Ubaldo
Lozoya in a car accident caused by the defendant's negligence. 185
Sarah and Ubaldo had been together for over thirty years and had
three children together. 186 They lived in a home they had jointly pur-
chased, and filed joint tax returns, but were never formally married.'"
Sarah testified that after the accident Ubaldo became depressed and
could not socialize or engage in other normal activities with her be-
cause he was plagued by constant pain.' 88 The defendant moved to
dismiss the claim on the grounds that Sarah could not state a claim
for loss of consortium because she and Ubaldo were not married. 18(3
The court held that claims for loss of consortium are not limited
to married spouses. 19° The court noted that New Mexico was one of
the last states to recognize a claim for spousal loss of consortititn. 191
Unlike the evolution of this cause of action in other states, recogni-
tion in New Mexico was always premised on a determination of
whether it was foreseeable that a particular plaintiff would suffer in-
jury as a result of the actions of the tortfeasor, not on the legal rela-
tionship between the direct victim and the plaintiff. 192 If it is foresee-
able that the person would sustain emotional injury due to the
damage to their relationship, a duty of care is owed to that person.'• 3
Therefore, a nonmarried cohabitant may recover for loss of consor-
tium due to the injuries sustained by the other partner from the neg-
ligent act. 194 Given recent societal trends indicating the increasing
prevalence of cohabitation, it is foreseeable that a victim of a negli-
188 Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 951,
184 hi.
195 Id.
188 Id. at 952.
187 Id. The court noted that although the plaintiff's relationship appears to satisfy the
traditional requirements of common law marriage, such unions are not recognized in New
Mexico. Id. at 956.
188 Lozoya, 661 ).3(1 at 952.
189 Id. at 950-51.
199 Id. at 951.
191 Id. at 953.
192 Id. at 955.
198 See Lozoya, 66 P.3(1 at 953-54.
194 Id. at 951.
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gent act could have a significant relationship with another person that
does not fit within the traditional understanding of family.' 95
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that although a legal rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and direct victim indicates that close
emotional ties are likely to be present, it does not form an independent
basis for recovery.'" The court reasoned that action for loss of consor-
tium protects an individual's relational interests, not an individual's
legal interestsY7 The basis for compensation is the harm to the plain-
tiffs ability to share the same kind of emotional connection with the
person injured, rather than harm to other status-based rights inherent
in marriage. 198
 The court warned that using legal status as a substitute
for an evaluation of the relationship between the parties leads to im-
precise results.'" It may include people who remain married despite
leading totally separate lives, yet exclude people who have a significant
relationship with another person and who suffer just as much as one
experienced in a committed marital relationship. 200
 A better approach
focuses on determining whether the emotional harm is foreseeable,
thus creating a duty of care. 201 The court also cited approvingly the
New Jersey court's rejection of a bright-line rule in Dunphy.202
Like the Dunphy court, the New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned
that judges and juries have frequently been called upon to assess the
quality of relationships in order to determine compensation.m No
particular difficulties are created by making this determination in the
context of loss of consortium claims. 204 Further, the court rejected
arguments that extending recovery for loss of consortium to nonmar-
lied cohabitants will lead to a manipulation of the scheme of benefits
and burdens that accompany marriage, or will otherwise damage the
state interest in promoting marriage Y05 Sarah and Ubaldo had a long
and caring relationship and showed a willingness to accept all of the
essential responsibilities of marriage. 2°G The court also again empha-
195 See id. at 957.
196 Id. at 954.
197 Id. at 955.
198 See Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 955.
199 Id.
200 Id.
"1 See id. at 953.
282 Id. at 955 (citing Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374).
293 See Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 955.
204
205 See id. at 956.
2°1/ See id. at 952.
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sized that consortium does not depend on legal status. 207 Ability to
bring the cause of action is not a benefit of marriage, but instead a
method for compensating those who have suffered significant harm
to their relational interests.2 08
After establishing that nonniarried partners can recover for loss of
consortium, the court looked to the standard developed by the Dunphy
court for measuring close familial relationships in the related action of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 209 In determining whether a
sufficient relationship exists, the New Mexico Supreme Court consid-
ered the duration of the relationship, exclusivity, degree of mutual de-
pendence, cohabitation, and the extent and nature of shared experi-
ences.") Further, the court reasoned that although New Mexico does
not give legal effect to common' law marriage, a presumption in favor
of recovery for loss of consortium arises when a couple can prove the
traditional elements of common law marriage, that is, mutual consent
or agreement to marry followed by mutual assumption of accompany-
ing obligations. 2 "
III. DENYING NONMARRIED COHABITANTS THE RIGHT TO RECOVER
FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM IS our OF STEP WITH SOCIETAL
CHANGES AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENT IN OTHER
AREAS OF TORT LAW
Many state courts last addressed the issue of cohabitant recovery
for loss of consortium nearly two decades ago. 212 At that time, they
faced a very different legal and social backdrop. 2 " The social trend
toward cohabitation was somewhat less marked and was of uncertain
durability.214 Similarly, the legal trends surrounding the cause of ac-
29? M. at 956.
Zoe Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 956.
209 M. at 955.
212 M. at 957.
211 Id. at 956.
212 See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988). The Supreme judicial
Cotta of Massachusetts recently revisited the issue of recovery for cohabitational partners
and held that such claims should still be barred. Fitzsimmons v. Mini Coach of Boston,
Inc., 799 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (Mass. 2003). This decision, however, was handed down alter
the landmark decision of Goudridgr a Department of Public Health, which extended the right
to marry to homosexual couples. 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). Given this vast expan-
sion in the right to marry, the court reasoned it is logical to deny rights to those who make
an active choice not to marry. See Fitzsimmons, 799 N.E.2d at 1257.
213 See supra notes 19, 65-89 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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tion were unclear.215
 First, although the majority of courts had already
adopted the view that loss of consortium protected relational interests
rather than property-based rights, they had yet to consider how far
those interests extended.216
 Most had yet to decide whether others
like children, siblings, and grandparents could recover.217
 Second,
courts had not yet allowed nonmarried cohabitants to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.218 This closely related tort
also examines the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and
the direct victim and has important implications for loss of consor-
tium actions.219 Third, in denying recovery to nonmarried cohabi-
tants, many courts expressed a variety of policy-based concerns. 2"
judges feared that allowing recovery would somehow damage the in-
stitution of marriage or open the floodgates to a wave of plaintiffs
who shared only an insignificant relationship to the direct victim. 22 '
Time and the expansion of recovery to nonmarried persons in other
torts has proven that most of these concerns are unwarranted or can
be addressed through the creation of proper standards. 222
A. Changing Social Attitudes Favor Recognition of Nonmarital Cohabitation
Relationships in Tort Law
A review of demographic statistics and sociological literature
confirms that nonmarital cohabitation has increased substantially in
the past twenty years. 223 Although already a pronounced trend by the
1980s, it was still a fairly novel and somewhat controversial living ar-
rangement. 224 There was a substantial increase in the number of
women who had at some point engaged in a cohabitational relation-
ship between 1987—around the time when many of the cohabitant
215 Seee. Slipra notes 65, 76-79, 82-86 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 56-1i4 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
218 See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1993).
2L9 See id. at 374.
2217 See  Elden, 758 P.2(.1 at 586-88; Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E. 1095, 1096
(Mass. 1987).
221
 See Elden, 758 P.2(1 at 586-88; Feliciano, 514 N.E. at 1096.
222 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 376; Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 1).3d 948, 955-56 (N.M. 2003).
222 See supra note 19 and accompanying text..
224 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. In fact, the government only started esti-
mating the number of coliabitating couples for vital statistic purposes in 1977, and even
this was through indirect measurements. See Casper & Cohen, supra note 1, at 237. Direct
measurements of cohabitation did not begin until 1995. Id. at 238.
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loss of consortium cases were decided—and 1995. 226 Now nearly half
of all adult American women between the ages of nineteen and forty-
four cohabitate at some point during their lives. 226 Such a large in-
crease in the number of people who participate in these relationships
indicates that this once novel way of structuring relationships has be-
come a normal, accepted practiCe. 227
In addition to the sheer statistical growth of cohabitation, there
has also been a change in social attitucles. 228 Once regarded as "living
in sin," cohabitation is now considered by many to be a normal phase
in relationships.229 It is often a late stage of courtship or similarly seri-
ous phase for couples who do not ultimately marry. 23° These demo-
graphic and social changes represent a major shift in our society. 231 To
a large extent, courts are struggling to bring legal doctrines in line
with social reality.232 Attempts to graft outmoded common law notions
about relationships on to this new social reality have led to unfair and
inconsistent results. 233 It is time that courts take notice of these fun-
damental changes by fashioning flexible standards that recognize the
important role of cohabitational relationships in the lives of millions
of Americans. 254
225 See Bumpass & Ltt, supra note 5, at 32. Between 1087 and 1995, the number of
women who had participated in a cohabitational relationship jumped from 33% to 45%. Id.
226 Id.
227 See id.
226 See Bumpass & Sweet, supra note 5, at 615-16.
229 See Bumpass et al., supra note 5, at 920.
230 See id. One very high profile example of the growing social acceptance of non marital
cohabitation can be seen in the relationship between Prince Charles and Camilla Parker
Bowles. Prince Pays for Camilla!s Bedroom to Be Furnished, TimEs (London), June 27, 2003,
http://www.titnesonline.comk/article/0 „2,726982,00.1uml (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). When
the Prince moved into his new residence at Clarence House, it was announced that Camilla
Parker Bowles would also take a room in the Royal Household. Id. This announcement,
which at one time would have provoked a firestorm of controversy, created only a minor stir
among the British public. Id.
251 See Goldstein & Kenney, supra note 3, at 507.
2s2 See, e.g., Elden, 758 P.2d at 586-88 (noting the increased prevalence of tionmarital
cohabitation, but declining to extend recovery); Richmond v. Shatford, No. CA 941249,
1995 WL 1146885, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1995) (holding that a nonmarital cohabi-
tational relationship satisfied the familial or other relationship requirement needed to
ground recovery); Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 957 (holding that the widespread acceptance of non-
marital cohabitation meant that emotional injuries to a cohabitational partner are riot
remote and unexpected).
233 See Elden, 758 P.2d at 585-86.
234 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
414	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:391
B. Changing Understandings of the Interests Protected by Loss of Consortium
Actions and the Expansion of Individuals Allowed to Bring Claims Support
Inclusion of Nonmarried Cohabitants as Potential Plaintiffs
In addition to these substantial societal changes, there have been
significant legal changes in the doctrine of loss of consortium. 233
 The
early common law roots of loss of consortium, grounded in concepts of
property law, have been thoroughly discredited. 236 Recovery is no
longer limited to husbands whose pecuniary interest in the services of
their wives suffers damage, 237 nor is recovery predicated merely on
status. 2ss In extending recovery to wives, courts expressly stated that
recovery instead covered harm to less tangible interests, like love, affec-
tion, and companionship.239
 This bundle of interests has been called
"relational interests. "240
 Once damage to relational interests became
the basis for loss of consortium actions, recovery for a broader class of
plaintiffs became possible.241 Others who shared an important relation-
ship with the direct victim, such as grandparents and children, were
gradually allowed to bring this cause of action as wel1. 242 Extension of
the right to recover to this group of individuals destroyed the argument
that recovery was somehow tied to vestigial notions of the rights and
status that flowed from traditional English marriage laws. 243 The emo-
tional harm suffered, not the legal duties between the plaintiff and the
victim, provides the basis for recovery.244
Based on this understanding of loss of consortium, nonmarried
cohabitants should also be allowed to bring claims. 245 Increasing
numbers of people choose to organize their intimate relations in this
manner.246
 Cohabitants often have deep emotional ties to one another
and frequently plan to marry in the future or have made a similar
long-term commitment.247
 Because an action for loss of consortium is
255 See .supra notes 52-55,65-89 and accompanying text.
256 See Ilitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813 (1).C. Cir. 1950).
237 Id.
259 Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 954; Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774,782 (N.M.
1998).
259 Mailer, 183 F.2d at 814.
249 Lozoya, 66 1'.3d at 955; Martin, supra note 41, at 1469.
241 See supra notes 68-75,80-86 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 68-75,80-86 and accompanying text.
243 See .1-filaffer, 183 F.2c1 at 813; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782-83.
244 Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 955.
245 See id. at 951.
246 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
247 SeeStanpass & Sweet, supra note 5, at 615.
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meant to compensate people when they suffer losses in important re-
lationships due to tortious injury, it seems reasonable that cohabitants
whose legitimate expectations arc overturned by the negligent acts of
a third party should be able to seek compensation for these losses. 248
Courts should not be deterred by the fact that nonmarital co-
habitation is not a legally recognized status. 249 Loss of consortium is
no longer based in marital status and related to the duties that flow
from that status. 250 In cases like Fernandez v. Walgreens Hastings Co., the
court focuses its analysis on the emotional ties between grandmother
and the deceased granddaughter, rather than analyzing the legal rela-
tionship between them. 251 Courts should follow the trend created by
cases that extend loss of consortium actions to siblings, grandparents,
and children, and examine the emotional tics between the plaintiff
and direct victim. 252
C. Expansion of Recovery in a Closely Parallel Tort Indicates That
Nonmarried Cohabitants Should Also Be Able to
Bring Mims for Loss of Consortium
The significant doctrinal changes in the related tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress also signal that recovery for loss of
consortium should be extended to nonmarried cohabitants. 253 In the
period since most courts denied the loss of consortium claims, several
landmark cases have extended recovery in this closely associated ac-
tion to norm-tarried cohabitants.254 These cases bear directly on the
issue of whether nonmarried cohabitants should be able to sue for
loss of consortium. 255
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is analogous
to loss of consortium.256 Both allow a person other than the direct vic-
tim to recover for the emotional distress suffered due to the tortious
act.257 Both limit recovery to those who have a close relationship with
the direct victim: 258 The main difference between the two actions is
248
 See Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 955.
245 See id.
25° iiiiaffer, 183 F.2c1 at 814; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782-83.
251 See 968 P.2d at 782-83.
252 See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
255 See .supra notes 137-140,152-153 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Richmond, 1995 WL 1146885, at *3; Dunphy, 642 A.2(1 at 376.
255 See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
2511 See .supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
2" See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 777.
258 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 777.
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that the plaintiff actually needs to witness the tortious act to recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 259 This limitation on re-
covery, coupled with a relationship requirement, may make courts
more willing to extend recovery in this tort because it provides an ad-
ditional restriction on what some perceive as an open-ended test. 26°
But this is an unpersuasive distinction between the two actions. 261 The
requirement that a plaintiff actually witness the tortious injury is
meant to limit the type of emotional harm that can ground recovery
for emotional distress.262 It is a distinct requirement, not a further
check on the relationship requirement. 263 Its purpose is to ensure that
the plaintiff genuinely suffered the type of intense emotional shock
that is compensable under the cause of action, rather than just the
normal anguish one experiences when a loved one is injured. 264 It is
not meant, however, to limit the types of relationships that are legally
sufficient to allow recovery.265 Therefore, the relationship require-
ment in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims is a useful
parallel for determining who can recover for loss of consortium. 266
Several courts have found that nonmarried cohabitants often
share close emotional relationships similar to those in more traditional
family settings. 267
 These relationships can be significant enough for the
partner of the direct victim to suffer lasting emotional harm when the
other is injurec1. 268 If this injury is foreseeable, principles of tort law
require that the plaintiff be compensated for emotional harm. 269 The
comparison between recovery in negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress and loss of consortium is instructive because both look to the re-
lationship between the plaintiff and the direct victim in order to de-
termine whether the emotional injury is severe enough to permit
259 See Ferrite' . v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Mass. 1980); su-
pra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
. 260 See supra notes 67-74, 80-86 and accompanying text.
201
 See. Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 953; Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782.
262
 Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 777.
263 See
264 See VI
265 See id.
266 Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 955 (citing Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 955).
267 See Richmond, 1995 WL 1146885, at •3; Dunphy, 642 A.2c1 at 380.
266 Du nphy, 642 A.2d at 380. Courts have developed useful and well-reasoned multifac-
tor tests to examine the significance of the relationship between nonmarried cohabitants.
Id. at 378. For example, New jersey looks to the degree of mutual dependence, extent of
common contributions to a joint life together, duration of relationship, extent and quality
of shared experience, and the "manner in which they related to each other in attending to
life's mundane requirements." Id.
262 See supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
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recovery. 2" It is logically inconsistent to hold that the cohabitational
relationship is significant enough to meet the requirements of the first
tort, but not the requirements of the closely related second tort. 271
D. Policy Concerns Advanced by Courts tojustify Denial of Recovery
Are Surmountable
In denying recovery for loss of consortium to cohabitational
partners, most courts seem to be less moved by the principles and
logic advanced in earlier cases, and instead, focus more on the poten-
tial fallout of allowing recovery.272 These policy-based rationales fall
into two broad categories. 275 The first relates to how the courts ap-
proach the concept of foreseeability and the need to limit conse-
quences of negligent acts by creating bright-line categorizations. 274
The second category of concerns centers on more prudential con-
cerns such as the potential harm to the institution of marriage, insti-
tutional competency of the courts, and fear of opening the floodgates
to a tidal wave of new tort cases. 276
1. Foreseeability and Bright-Line Categorizations
The most frequent concern expressed by courts in loss of consor-
tium claims is that emotional harm to a cohabitant is somehow less
foreseeable than to a spouse of the direct victim. 276 Therefore, they
reason that it is unfair to hold a tortfeasor liable for these damages
because there can be no duty to an unforeseeable plaintiff. 277 First, it
is important to note that the doctrine of foreseeability in actions like
this is something of a legal fiction.278 For example, a tortfeasor who
hits a woman crossing the street probably has no idea if she has a
spouse, a long-term partner, or children. 279 Even if the actor did have
this kind of knowledge, it is unlikely that it would influence the ac-
tor's behavior. 28° The actor would not try harder to swerve knowing
270 See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text
271 See. Regan, supra note 179, at 146E
272 See Elden, 758 P.2d at 586.
275 See supra notes 104-111,114-131 and accompanying text.
274
 see supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 114-151 and accompanying text.
276 See Elden, 758 P.2d at 586,
277 sr, id.
275 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d al 376; Lozoya, 66 P.3(1 at 953.
270
	 Elden, 758 P.2d at 582.
250 See id.
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that the woman is married and that there might be a higher damage
award. 281
 Second, demographic statistics show that the rate of non-
marital cohabitation has significantly increased since many of the
most influential loss of consortium cases were decided.282 Although
courts might have doubted the prevalence of these relationships
twenty years ago (and thus the foreseeablity of cohabitants as poten-
tial plaintiffs), this is no longer the case. 283
Another key policy justification advanced by courts in denying
recovery to nonmarried cohabitants is the need to circumscribe po-
tential liability for tortfeasors by creating bright-line categorizations. 284
Courts have held that the flexible standards suggested by plaintiffs to
assess the significance of a given relationship fail to provide sufficient
certainty. 285
 But as pointed out by the New Jersey State Supreme Court
in Dunphy v. Gregor, tort law has another overriding goal to provide
compensation to victims of tortious acts. 286 When courts resort to
bright-line categorizations, they abandon their mandate to sort out
which plaintiffs have real, cognizable injuries. 287 In the context of loss
of consortium claims, bright-line categories can prevent those who
suffer serious harm from receiving compensation. 288 Moreover, they
provide a windfall to the tortfeasor who would otherwise have to pay
for the harm caused. 288
2. Prudential Concerns About Expansion of Recovery to Nonmarried
Cohabitational Partners
Although concerns about foreseeability and the need to limit the
liability of a tortfeasor dominate the reasoning of most opinions deny-
ing recovery, several other important policy considerations are consis-
tently advanced. 28° First, courts fear that recognition of claims by
nonmarried cohabitants will harm the state interest in promoting
marriagC.291 Second, they express a fear that judges will not be able to
281 .See id.
282 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
2" See, e.g., Elden, 758 1 3.2d at 588; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
285 See, e.g., Elden, 758 1 1.2d at 588; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
28 '1 See (142 A.2d. at 378.
287
 See id.
288 See id.
289 See id.
29° See Elden, 758 P.2d at 586-88; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096; supra notes 276-289 and
accompanying text.
291 See, e.g., Elden, 758 P.2(1 at 586-88; Feliciano, 514 N.E.2d at 1096.
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fashion and juries will not be able to apply a reliable test to measure
the significance of the relationship. 292 This in turn could spawn a
flood of suits brought by people who are only peripherally connected
to the direct victim." Finally, some courts have expressed the con-
cern that determinations of the significance of a relationship would
involve inquires into highly private matters that should remain free
from judicial scrutiny.294
Contrary to these concerns, allowing nonmarried cohabitants to
recover will not harm the state's interest in promoting marriage.• It
is highly unlikely that a couple will make such a momentous decision
such as whether or not to marry based on the increased ability to re-
cover in tort suits. 296 Couples will be more motivated by issues of love,
personality, and long-term compatibility. 297 Also, although sonic critics
claim that extending recovery to nonmarried cohabitants grants them
rights without corresponding responsibilities, this is not the case for
recovery in loss of consortium actions.298 Providing compensation for
loss of consortium is different than extending other benefits typically
attendant to marriage like health insurance coverage and tax &due-
tions.296 Although those are truly benefits, or extras given to people
solely because they choose to marry, damages awarded in a successful
loss of consortium action are compensation for an actual injury suf-
fered. 30° Further, the ability to recover cannot be obtained simply by
marrying."' The injury has already occurred, and subsequent mar-
riage cannot give retroactive standing."
In addition, determining the significance of a relationship is not
beyond the institutional competency of judges or juries." The tests
developed by the Dunphy and Lozoya courts provide useful frameworks
on which to draw."' Both tests look to a mix of objective factors, such
as the degree of financial dependence, length of relationship, and
other less tangible factors that are still within the ability of a jury to
292 See, e.g., Elden, 758 P.2(1 at 587.
2" See id. at 587-88.
294 See id. at 587.
295 See Lozoya, 66 R34 at 955.
296 See id.
297 See id.
2" Id. at 956; Regan, supra note 179, at 1460.
2" See Lozoya, 66 P.3(1 at 956; Regan, supra note 179, at 1460.
5" See Lozoya, 66 Rid at 956.
591 See id.
542 See id.
303 See id. at 955 (citing Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378).
914 See id. at 957; Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
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determine based on common life experience." Further, courts have
proven that they are capable of making these sorts of inquires in
other contexts." The court must ask many of the same types of ques-
tions when a married person sues for loss of consortium in order to
assess the quality of the relationship and the resulting harm to the
marital relationship. 307 Additionally, time has shown that this more
flexible approach will not open the floodgates to frivolous suits." In
the ten years since Dunphy, New Jersey courts have not been inun-
dated with cases of individuals attempting to recover for trivial rela-
tional interests." Nor has New Mexico experienced a surge in cases
since Lozoya was decided.31 °
Finally, allowing nonmarried cohabitants to recover for loss of
consortium by demonstrating the significance of their relationship and
documenting the resulting harm will not represent an unwanted judi-
cial intrusion into highly private matters.sn It is important to remem-
ber that a plaintiff can choose whether or not to initiate a tort ac-
tion." A plaintiff with deep concerns regarding a court's inquiry into
the plaintiff's private life would simply elect not to sue the tortfeasor. 313
CONCLUSION
Nonmarried cohabitants should be allowed to bring loss of con-
sortium claims when their relational interests are damaged by a tor-
tious injury to their partner. Courts have abandoned the original con-
struction of the loss of consortium doctrine which allowed recovery
305 See Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 957; Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
3°8 Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
3{/7 Id.
308 See S. Claire Swift, Note, Bystander Liability After Dunphy v. Gregor: A Proposal for a
New Definition of the Bystander, 15 REV. Luic. 579, 595 (1996) (discounting fear of unlim-
ited tordeasor liability).
" See, e.g., In re Baby T., 734 A.2d 304, 314 (N.J. 1999); Gendek v. Poblete, 654 A.2d
970, 973 (N.J. 1995); Thalman v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 676 A.2d 611, 614 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
310 See, e.g., Murphy v. Bitsoili, 320 F. Stipp. 2d 1174, 1205 (D.N.M. 2004) (denying re-
covery to live-in girlfriend of victim because she did not meet the relational test set forth
Lozoya); Fitzjerrell v. City of Gallup ex rel. Gallup Police Dep't, 79 P.3d 836, 838 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2003) (determining whether adult siblings of deceased can recover for loss of consor-
tium). Since Lozoya was decided, only two reported cases have drawn on its reasoning to
determine eligibility for loss of consortium recovery. See Murphy, 320 F. Stipp. 2d at 1205;
Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d at 838.
311 See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
312 See id. at 373. Eileen Dunphy chose not to bring a loss of consortium claim, instead
filing only a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Id.
313 See id.
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only for pecuniary damage to property-like interests in one's wife.
The class of those allowed to bring claims for loss of consortium has
gradually expanded to include wives, siblings, children, and grand-
parents. This expansion was made possible by the recognition that
loss of consortium protects the ,emotional well-being that people de-
rive from their relationships.
Similarly, nonmarried cohabitants have an interest in the emo-
tional well-being that they derive from family-like relationships. Increas-
ingly, people are turning to this once non-traditional form of organiz-
ing their intimate family relationships. Courts should take notice of this
changing social reality and fashion fair, appropriate remedies to com-
pensate cohabitants when they suffer harm to their relational interests.
The importance of the emotional ties between cohabitants has
been recognized in a closely analogous context, the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Courts have recognized that nonmar-
ried cohabitants can suffer real and lasting emotional harm when they
witness the negligent injury of their cohabitational partner. Both loss
of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress limit re-
covery to those who have a close family or family-like relationship to
the direct victim. Therefore, cases like Dunphy v. Gregor, which extend
recovery to cohabitants, also provide a useful framework for courts to
draw on in extending loss of consortium actions.
Finally, the policy concerns about extending loss of consortium
actions raised by many courts are unwarranted. Expanding recovery
to cohabitants will not unduly increase the liability of tortfeasors, nor
damage the state interest in marriage. Moreover, it will not lead courts
into unfamiliar territory in assessing the significance of cohabitational
relationships. Allowing cohabitants to recover for loss of consortium
will, however, avoid unjust situations, and allow those who suffer
genuine emotional injuries to receive compensation.
ALISHA M. CARLILE
